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[Introductory note: Professor David Solomons was born in London and was educated at the London
School Economics. He is a fellow of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales.
After professional experience in London, he joined the faculty of the University of London and
became Reader in Accounting there in 1948. He became the University of Bristol's first Professor of
Accounting in 1955 and left Britain to join the faculty of The Wharton School of the University of
Pennsylvania in 1959 as Professor of Accounting. He was chairman of the University's accounting
department from 1969 to 1975 and became its first Arthur Young Professor of Accounting in 1974.
He was on leave from the University of Pennsylvania during 1972-73 to direct the Long Range
Enquiry into Education and Training for the Accountancy Profession, an inquiry which was
commissioned by the British professional accounting bodies. His book-length report on this project, "Prospectus for a
Profession," was published in London in 1974. His book "Divisional Performance: Measurement and Control" earned him the -
American Institute of CPAs' award for notable contributions to accounting literature in 1969.
David Solomons was a member of the AICPA's Study on Establishment of Accounting Principles (The Wheat Committee)
which led to the setting up of the Financial Accounting Standards Board in 1973. He was the American Accounting
Association's Director of Research 1968-1970 and is currently President of the Association. He has held visiting appointments
in the Universities of California (at Berkeley), Auckland and at IMEDE (Management Development Institute) in Lausanne,
Switzerland. He was Visiting Erskine Fellow at the University of Canterbury in New Zealand in September-October 1976. Dr.
Solomons's teaching activities have lain mainly in the areas of managerial accounting and controllership.
The recent report of the Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities (The Cohen Commission) recommends that responsibility for
setting auditing standards remain in the private sector but be transferred from AudSEC to a full time Auditing Standards Board.
Applying the model of the FASB to auditing has obvious attractions. But auditing and accounting are different and the
machinery which is appropriate in one field may not be appropriate in the other. The Cohen recommendation deserves to be
looked at critically.
Thank you, Dr. Mellman. I knew that whatever adjectives Dr. Mellman used in referring to my subject,
he would certainly describe it as timely. The adjective timely, incidentally, was also used by someone
who stood at this podium just a year ago and who also talked about auditing standards. On April 11,
1977, Maurice Moonitz delivered the last Emanuel Saxe Distinguished Lecture in Accounting of the
19761977 series. His subject was auditing standards. From the printed version of his lecture it appears
that Dr. Mellman, in introducing him, referred to the timeliness of his topic. You may think that coming
back to the subject of auditing standards only a year later, I lay myself open to the charge of churning
up well-trodden ground. I feel called upon, therefore, to defend my choice of topic.
THE INSTITUTE'S SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AUDSEC
In the first place, the question, who should be responsible for setting auditing standards, is indeed even
more timely today than it was a year ago. It is only some two months since the final report of the Cohen
Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities was published. The Commission's recommendations, as Dr.
Mellman mentioned just now, included one to replace the present Auditing Standards Executive
Committee by a full-time Auditing Standards Board. The Commission's tentative conclusions, which
contained the same recommendations, had been made public early in April, 1977, immediately before
Dr. Moonitz delivered his lecture. The American Institute of CPAs responded by setting up a special
committee to examine all of the Commission's recommendations. That special committee rejected the
proposal for a full-time board and called instead for a restructuring of the Auditing Standards Executive
Committee (AudSEC). It suggested that another special committee be set up to study the restructuring
of AudSEC in more detail, and that was done by a resolution of the Board of Directors of the Institute in
June, 1977.
The special committee on AudSEC, as I shall call it, is made up of five former presidents or chairmen of
the Board of the AICPA -- the title of the office was changed during the period spanned by their
incumbencies -- and its chairman is Walter Oliphant. The Oliphant Committee arrived at its conclusions
at the end of February, after a public hearing which it held at the beginning of that month, and its
preliminary report was presented to the Board of Directors of the Institute at the beginning of March.
The conclusions reached in that preliminary report were made public in the CPA Letter of-March 27,
less than a month ago, and they also appear in the April issue (the current issue) of the Journal of
Accountancy. The Committee's full report will be presented to the Council of the Institute at its Spring
meeting early next month.
I have gone into these events at some length because I have become personally involved in them. I was
not associated with the special committee on AudSEC during the earlier stages of its work nor while it
was gathering evidence, but during the final stages of its deliberations, I was asked to work with it to
help in the formulation of its report. I suppose it is just conceivable that my present involvement with
the setting of auditing standards is not entirely unrelated to my membership on the Wheat Committee in
1971 and 1972 which led to some important charges in the setting of accounting standards. In any case,
I have probably said enough to explain why I thought that I might have something useful to say about
this subject tonight.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF AUDITING STANDARDS
To trace the development of auditing standards, we might go back to April 1917, when the American
Institute of Accountants (as it was then called) issued a memorandum which was published in the
Federal Reserve Bulletin under the title "Approved Methods for the Preparation of Balance Sheet
Statements." There is no need to go in detail into the developments that took place during the ensuing
twenty years after that publication. Clearly, the next important date is the McKesson & Robbins case in
1938 which created, to quote a phrase used by John Carey in his history of the Institute, a "crisis in
auditing." Following on that case, in January 1939, the Institute appointed a special committee "to
examine into auditing procedure and other related questions in the light of recent public discussion,"
and their report was adopted with modifications by the Institute members in 1939. By an amendment to
the by-laws which took place at that time, the Committee on Auditing Procedures, the predecessor
committee of what is now AudSEC, was established as a standing committee of the Institute. As a
matter of fact it was not until 1966 that it became certain that that committee had the right to make
binding pronouncements on auditing without having them approved by members of the Institute.
The next important date is February, 1941, when the SEC, in Accounting Series Release #21, made it a
requirement that the independent accountant's report on financial statements filed with the commission
should state "whether the audit was made in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards
applicable in the circumstances." I am not sure that that was the first time that the expression "generally
accepted auditing standards" was used, but that date, February 1941
does represent a landmark, and the ASR prompted the Committee on Auditing Procedure to embark on
a special study of auditing standards, as distinct from auditing procedures, on which it had been issuing
pronouncements hitherto. Then the war intervened, and the whole activity came to a grinding halt. It
started up again after the war, and in October 1947, the committee issued its Tentative Statement of
Auditing Standards -- Their Generally Accepted Significance and Scope. It is here that nine of the ten
broad auditing standards were set out. The nine were adopted in September 1948, and the tenth standard
was adopted in the following year. Incidentally, 1948 is also worthy of note in that it was in October of
that year that the committee, in Statement of Auditing Procedure #24, presented a "recommended
revised short form of accountant's report or certificate," a form of report which is substantially
unchanged to this day. Of course, if the Cohen Commission gets its way, it may not remain unchanged
much longer.
We could spend some time discussing the distinction between auditing standards and auditing
procedures, but I don't find that kind of quibble very rewarding; and in fact, when AudSEC issues its
statements now, it is very difficult to say whether
they are dealing with standards or procedures. Since 1973, all statements issued by the committee have
been called Statements on Auditing Standards, SAS's.
When the FASB came into existence, or when it looked as if it was about to come into existence in 1972
-- it did not in fact take over from the APB until 1973 -- the Institute reorganized itself, in readiness, so
to speak, for the phasing out of the APB, which had been a senior committee of the Institute. In the
course of the transition, the Institute adopted a divisional structure with a number of divisions, each
division having an executive committee. It was at that time that the Accounting Standards Executive
Committee came into existence as a new senior committee of the Institute, for the purpose, among other
things, of providing input to the FASB; and it was at that time, also, that the Committee on Auditing
Procedure became AudSEC, the Auditing Standards Executive Committee.
THE SOURCES OF AUDITING STANDARDS
Auditing standards have come into existence for a variety of reasons, and have been prompted by a
number of different agencies, persons, committees and situations.' Sometimes, members of AudSEC
itself have taken the initiative for having a matter placed on the agenda. SAP #39, on working papers,
for instance, is an example of that kind of auditing standard. Other auditing standards have been
prompted by the work of other divisions of the Institute, or other organizations outside the profession.
SAP #42, which deals with reporting when a certified public accountant is not independent, resulted
from an opinion on the matter of independence which was issued by the Institute's Committee on
Professional Ethics. Activities of the Accounting Principles Board and the FASB have given rise to
auditing standards. For instance, when APB Opinion #19 on reporting changes in financial position was
issued, the auditing committee had to follow up with an auditing statement revising the auditor's
standard form of report to give recognition to APB #19. I could quote other examples.
Several important auditing standards have been the result of initiatives taken outside the profession, and
notably, of course, by the SEC. Just to give two examples, Statement on Auditing Standards #4, which
was issued at the end of 1974, on quality control considerations for a fan of independent auditors, was a
response to criticism from the Commission on the quality of audit practice. Another example is SAS
#13, issued May, 1976, on reports on limited review of interim financial information. That was made
necessary by ASR 177.
Litigation, not unnaturally, has given rise to a number of auditing standards. I have already referred to
the important part played by the McKesson and Robbins case in the history of this matter. The Allied
Crude Oil case led to SAP #37. The Yale Express case led to SAP #41, issued in October, 1969, dealing
with subsequent discovery effects existing at the date of the auditor's report. One of the most
troublesome of the statements issued by AudSEC, SAS #6, which was issued in I 1975, and on which I
shall comment later because it took no less than six years to get it out, dealt with related party
transactions and arose out of the U.S. Financial case. More recently SAS #16, which was issued only in
January of last year, dealing with the independent auditor's responsibility for the detection of errors or
irregularities, was issued by AudSEC after an inquiry by a special committee into the Equity Funding
case. Finally, also in January of 1977, SAS #17, dealing with the illegal acts of clients, might be
described as being the result of pressure from Congress and from the press. SAS #17 provides guidance
for an auditor when apparently illegal acts by clients such as bribes, illegal political contributions, and
so on, come to his attention. Obviously, these examples are merely illustrative, and not exhaustive
THE PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS
At the end of this lecture I intend to comment on the proposals which the special committee with which
I've been working is making to deal with some of these problems. But before one can evaluate those
recommendations, it is necessary to understand what the present system is and also to look at some of
the alternatives which have been proposed.
The authority for the promulgation of generally accepted auditing standards, which are binding,
incidentally, on the Institute's members under Rule 202 of its Rules of Conduct, is vested in AudSEC.
The standards do not require clearance from the Institute's Council, and if other bodies within the
Institute are considering pronouncements which bear on auditing, those too have to be cleared with
AudSEC.
The committee has twenty-one members, all of them members of the American Institute. Twenty of
those members, at the present time, are practicing auditors, and one is a professor of accounting. They
are all appointed annually by the chairman of the Institute, with the approval of the board of directors.
Normally they are reappointed twice after their initial appointments, so that normally they serve for
three years but not more. There is, therefore a rotation, and one third of the members retire each year.
All of the members serve part-time. They are expected to devote about one third of their time to the
work of the committee. They are entirely unpaid; and generally speaking, they don't even claim
reimbursement for their expenses. Of course, the unpaid time which these men give is not the sum total
of the service which their firms give to the profession, because very often they are backed up by
assistants and advisors and so on, and if you attend a meeting of AudSEC, as I did the other day, you
will find that in addition to the members there will be quite a battery of advisors sitting in the
background. Much of the work of drafting is handled by task forces, also entirely unpaid. Usually a task
force has a member of AudSEC as its chairman. At any one time, there may be as many as twenty-five
task forces at work.
The voting rule of AudSEC, like some other important Institute committees, is that it requires a two-
thirds majority to expose a draft statement, or to approve a final statement. Each paragraph, incidentally,
has to be approved by a two-thirds vote separately.
THE CASE FOR THE PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS
The present arrangements have their critics. You know that, and I shall say more about those criticisms
later. But let us just consider, before we go on, what the strengths of the present arrangements are. The
criticism that has been directed at the process of setting auditing standards has been relatively muted,
compared with the criticism that has been directed to the FASB and its predecessor, the APB. Even
Professor Briloff, whom I'm glad to see sitting in the front row here, and who has been eloquent in his
criticism of the performance of auditors, has had relatively little to say about the auditing standards
themselves, or the process by which they have come into existence. Let me quote from him. "If auditors
had, in fact, recognized the significance of the term standards, in the phrase "auditing standards," there'
would never have been a proliferation of litigation against the leaders of our profession for their dismal
performance of the attest function." That statement is reproduced in a statement of his which is printed
in The Accounting Establishment, the Metcalf Committee's staff study, although I believe the statement
was originally made to the Moss Committee.
Professor Briloff goes on in his statement to the Moss Committee to criticize SAS #5 for what he calls
AudSEC's 'pusillanimity' in its treatment of the meaning of "present fairly in conformity with generally
accepted accounting principles" in the independent auditor's report. To be fair to the committee, one has
to recognize that they were constrained by the present state of generally accepted accounting principles.
Accounting principles are the concern of the FASB, not of AudSEC. And I think fair-minded critics will
probably not share Professor Briloff's harsh judgment of the performance of AudSEC in its handling of
"present fairly." If generally accepted accounting principles are such that financial statements do not
clearly present financial information fairly, it is very difficult for AudSEC, dealing with auditing
standards, to do a great deal about it. Let me add, by the way, since I'm taking on Professor Briloff here,
that from an interview with him which was published in Barron's in April 1976 (also reproduced in The
Accounting Establishment), I am not sure that he would have done better than, and maybe not as well
as, AudSEC in dealing with this matter. Let me quote from that interview. At one point he says, "I want
the auditor who is reviewing the economic events with respect to that enterprise, based upon his
professional integrity and professional consciousness, to develop the financial statements which he
believes will present the economic event fairly." At that point the interviewer interrupted him and said,
"Okay, what's fairly?" And Professor Briloff replied, "At the moment, I'm willing to fall back on a
negative response. The avoidance of the unfair, that which we can discern to be unfair." I don't believe
that that holds out promise of dealing with "present fairly" more effectively than AudSEC did in SAS
#5.
Maurice Moonitz, whom I've already referred to,. gave his verdict on the profession's performance in
setting auditing standards in a monograph of his which was published by the American Accounting
Association in 1974, called Attaining Agreement on Standards in the Accounting Profession. He was
much more reassuring about the state of health of the profession in relation to auditing standards than he
was in relation to accounting standards. Let me quote from that monograph. He says, "The existing set
of standards is not perfect, nor is it necessarily the best in the world, nor are the standards, such as they
are, meticulously observed by all practitioners in all circumstances. The record does show that the
profession is able to generate the written expression of what constitutes generally accepted auditing
standards. No one can claim that the set of standards does not exist; furthermore, when the profession
wants to or has to, it can revise those standards and do so quickly. It also has on hand an enforcement
mechanism that it can use if it chooses to do so. The organization is there, it works. "(1) That was
Maurice Moonitz, and again, later in the same monograph, he says, in the same context, "The
organizational pattern fits the task to be done. The process works."(2)
The Cohen Commission called for a fairly radical change in the standard-setting process, and I'll
comment on that very shortly. They wanted to move from a relatively large, part-time, unpaid
committee, to a small? full-time board. Yet their judgement on the present arrangements was not at all
unfavorable. Again I quote, from the Cohen Report this time. "The Commission believes chat the
auditing standards-setting process has worked reasonably well. Neither the Commission's examination
of significant cases against auditors nor any of its ocher research has uncovered significant evidence
that audit failures are generally traceable to deficiencies in existing auditing standards. Existing auditing
standards could be improved, and many improvements are suggested in this report. However, the
existing standard-setting structure appears quite capable of providing the necessary evolution. "(3)
Let me quickly sum what seem to me to be the strengths of the present arrangements. First, the setting
of auditing standards is in the hands of auditors, and they surely are the people who are best equipped
by knowledge and experience to assess the benefits and the costs of auditing. Again, if I can quote from
the Cohen Commission, "No need has been established," they say, "for taking the auditing standard-
setting function from the domain of the accounting profession. Such a drastic institutional change would
involve substantial costs. It cannot be justified unless significant improvements are needed and can be
expected to result from the change."(4) They do suggest a change, but they don't suggest taking the
matter out of the hands of the accounting profession.
A second point in favor of the present arrangement is that it is backed up by Rule 202 of the Institute's
Rules of Conduct and the authority of the AICPA is much broader, less potent no doubt but much
broader, than that of the SEC. The SEC, after all, has jurisdiction only over about ten thousand
companies. The jurisdiction of auditors, most of whom are members of the AICPA, is much, much
broader than that.
The third point in favor of a large volunteer committee, though not necessarily as large as the present
committee, is that the varied membership that you can get on such a committee can bring to bear on
these very technical problems a large number of highly skilled practitioners, drawn from a wide
spectrum of firms of all sizes and with all kinds of backgrounds. And if you need a large number of
subcommittees and task forces, that relatively large membership is a real advantage. Of course, there
will be a point of diminishing returns where increasing size gives rise to increasing problems of
communication and effectiveness. It is fairly widely felt that the present twenty-one man AudSEC is too
large, and one of the proposals of the special committee calls for a reduction in its size.
A fourth point is that if standards are to be effective they must command widespread support; and they
are likely, I suggest, to do so if they are developed within the profession rather than imposed from
outside, even if that imposition is by a group within the profession which stands apart from and is not
one with those who must apply the standards.
SOME CRITICISMS OF THE PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS
Now let us look at the other side. What are the criticisms of the present arrangements? The Cohen
Commission noted that "in contrast to the amount of criticism generated by the accounting standard-
setting process, suggestions for change in setting auditing standards have been infrequent.''(5) The
reason for that, no doubt, is that there is a relative lack of public interest in auditing standards as
compared with accounting standards. Nevertheless, we must recognize that there have been critics who
have suggested weaknesses in the present system.
The Commission's first criticism is that "present guidance on the application of auditing standards to
audits of different size entities is inadequate.'' (6) I don't propose to say more about that except that it
clearly does not constitute a case for a radical, structural change in the kind of committee that sets
standards. It is something that the committee can rectify, if it needs rectification. The Institute has
already set up a separate committee, the Accounting and Review Services Committee, to take on
responsibility for dealing with unaudited statements and various other kinds of review which stop short
of audit. Incidentally, small audit firms are quite well represented both on AudSEC and on the new
Accounting and Review Services Committee, so that there is no reason why small businesses should be
neglected when auditing standards are under discussion.
The Commission then raises another criticism. "Many pronouncements could usefully provide more
specific guidance....There appears to be a tendency to make the guidance as general as possible." (7)
They go on to give examples of what they mean by that. No doubt there is some substance in that
criticism. But it clearly must be a matter of opinion as to how far an auditing standard can usefully go in
giving specific directions. If it doesn't leave room for professional judgement there will be grounds for
criticism on that score. It has been pointed out many times that standards are not textbooks, and a
standard-seeing body like the old APB, and like the FASB, is constantly gingerly balancing itself on the
very thin line between excessive generality on the one side and writing a cookbook, as it's usually
called, on the other. Again, I don't believe this criticism by the Cohen Commission calls for major
surgery, and some of the proposals of the special committee as I shall show shortly, will take care of
that criticism, to the extent that there is substance in it.
The Commission goes on, in the course of its discussion about excessive generality, to suggest that
AudSEC's reluctance to be specific is due to the view that innovations in auditing are proprietary
matters, and chat firms are anxious to retain any competitive advantage that they may have, if they think
they have developed a new method or a new approach to auditing, and may want to keep it to
themselves. The Commission says: "Many, if not most, of the technological and methodological
advances in auditing have in fact been developed by auditing firms." That, of course, is a rather strong
argument for leaving the seeing of auditing standards in the hands of auditors, if that in fact is where
innovations and developments have come from.
Then there is the criticism that AudSEC is not sufficiently productive, chat it takes too long to get
standards out, and that it fails to anticipate problems before they become acute. There's no doubt that
some standards have taken too long to get out. Here again, the problem is to balance d e need for speed
on the one hand and the need for high quality in the standards on the other. Some of the matters on
AudSEC's agenda are very complicated, and without protracted consideration I doubt whether a high
quality of standard could be developed. The classic case, which is always thrown up in the face of
AudSEC is SAS #6, dealing with related party transactions. This actually took from February, 1969 to
July 1975 to promulgate. The explanation for that, if you look into it carefully, is that in fact the
problems there were not auditing problems but accounting problems. There are no accounting rules for
handling transactions between related parties. There are no accounting standards for the measurement
and the disclosure of transactions which are not entered into at arm's length. There's much more that
could be said about that. It should not have taken six years to deal with the problem; but it was, indeed,
a very complex problem.
As for the alleged failure of AudSEC to anticipate problems and to recognize emerging problems, that's
always an easy charge to throw at a committee, and a very difficult charge to rebut. I believe that one of
the proposals of the special committee can go far to deal with that, and I shall comment on it later.
The final criticism voiced by the Cohen Commission is concerned with the quality of the members of
the standards committee and of the staff. They are particularly critical of the fact that members of the
committee normally may not serve for more than three years. They say there's a loss of momentum
there. That, too, is a matter which is easily rectified without turning the committee into a full-time
board.
THE BURTON PROPOSAL
In the current (April) issue of the Journal of Accountancy, there is an extremely interesting article by
Sandy Burton, one of AudSEC's severest critics, on the profession's institutional structure in the 1980's.
In that article he presents his plan for what he calls a "legislatively sanctioned self-regulating body,"
NARAF, the National Association of Registered Accounting Firms. Let me quote a passage in which he
refers to auditing standards. "In general," he says, "the standard-setting mechanism has not resulted in
an innovative approach to the auditing function, but has tended to enshrine or justify current practices.
Recent auditing standards have emphasized protection against litigation, and their consideration by
AudSEC has been heavily influenced by participation of legal counsel for the major firms. AudSEC has
been hesitant to increase auditors' responsibilities, except under pressure from outside forces." Here
again we are in an area where judgements may legitimately differ. There is a real question as to whether
it is part of the responsibility of a standard-setting body to increase the auditors' responsibilities. It
would be relatively easy for them to do so, although without the backing of the SEC, they wouldn't get
very far. But one can well imagine that vigorous action from within the profession to expand the scope
of its work and its responsibilities, with a corresponding increase in its fees, would at once be met by
accusations that such actions were self-serving.
It is impossible for any socially sensitive person not to share Sandy Burton's concern that the profession
should be responsive to its social obligations, in the matter of auditing standards as in other respects.
The question is whether the best way to improve that social responsiveness is by an extension of public
regulation. Sandy's article in the journal is immediately followed by a rebuttal from Al Sommer,
formerly a member of the SEC. He says that "Sandy Burton's proposal runs directly against the
increasingly predominant current of American opinion which looks to a reduction in the level of
existing regulation, abstention from the adoption of more regulation, unless the reason is extremely
compelling, and a greater reliance on the subtler forces in our society to bring about evolutionary
reform." I would prefer to try to work towards the achievement of the ends which Sandy Burton has in
mind through the more modest proposals that the special committee has made. At least I think they
should be given a chance before moving on to a more drastic system of regulation by a government
agency or quasi government agency.
THE COHEN COMMISSION'S PROPOSAL
Sandy Burton's proposal calls for a body very similar to NASD, the National Association of Securities
Dealers, which has the backing of legislation behind it. The Cohen Commission's proposal was less
drastic than that. Their recommendation was simply to replace AudSEC by a smaller, full-time auditing
standards board. The proposal comes as a bit of a surprise at the end of the chapter in the report dealing
with auditing standards, because up to that point, they'd been reasonably congratulatory. Certainly they
were not very critical about the work of AudSEC and the standards that AudSEC has issued. They seem
to have looked around, seen that the APB had been replaced by the FASB, and then sought a symmetry
between the full-time Accounting Standards Board and a similar full-time Auditing Standards Board.
The arguments which led the Wheat Committee to recommend the creation of the FASB included some
which really do not have anything like the same force in the field of auditing. The principle argument
for establishing the FASB as a full-time body, outside the American Institute, was the need that we saw
for accounting standards to be in the hands of persons who would be independent, and who would be
seen to be independent, of the interests of their clients. Now the need for those who set standards to be
independent is not nearly so great in the auditing field as in the field of accounting. Private interests
outside the profession are much less sensitive to changes in auditing standards than they are to the
pronouncements of the FASB. If there is an independence argument at all, it probably rests on the
ground that a volunteer committee may be unduly reluctant to vote for a standard which involves a
change in the procedures used by the firms from which its members come. There is dislocation and
expense which follows on any kind of change, and there may, therefore, be a bias against change. Of
course, the costs of change are real costs, and they should be open of the considerations when you are
considering changing a standard. But there are other and better ways, I believe, of protecting society
against undue reluctance to change. One is to change the voting rule of AudSEC, which the special
committee proposes to do, so as to make it easier to get a standard adopted, and more difficult,
therefore, to oppose change. The other main proposal is for the creation of an advisory council about
which I shall say a word in a moment.
There was a second reason for setting up the FASB in the accounting field in the form that it took. The
APB was a senior committee of the Institute, and unless there had been a change in the bylaws, no non-
members of the Institute could serve on it which meant that no non-CPAs could serve on it. So if you
wanted to have an economist on the APB, you couldn't have had one without changing the bylaws. Of
course that could have been done, but it wasn't. We thought that, unlike the APB, the FASB should be
set up in such a way that skills other than those that were found among CPAs could be brought to bear
on accounting standards. So far as I know; the FASB has not as yet had a non-accountant member,
although it does have non-CPA members; but at least the scope for that broadening of the membership
of the FASB there. Now here again, there is much less scope in the auditing field for outsiders to
contribute to discussions of auditing than there is to discussions of accounting. There is very little
interest in auditing outside the ranks of the profession, and it is rather unlikely that there are people
outside those ranks who could contribute in a major way to the work of the setting of auditing standards.
However, if there are such people, they should be brought in; and another proposal of the special
committee would make that possible, without going to a full-time board.
The last reason I shall comment on for moving to a full-time accounting board was that there was a
sense of crisis in 1970-71. There was a heavy backlog of problems and a great need to speed up the
operations. There is not a great backlog of auditing standards waiting for consideration, so far as I
know, and there is not a situation which cannot be, with a reasonable hope of success, handled by a
streamlined AudSEC.
These are the fairly strong arguments against the Cohen Commission's proposal; and there are two
arguments which reinforce them on the other side. One is the sense of alienation that may develop
within a profession if one set of people makes the standards and a different set of people has to
implement them. This is a situation which is surely best avoided if it can be avoided without great loss
of effectiveness. And finally there is the very real problem of recruiting people of the right caliber to
serve on a full-time auditing standards board. Even if you allowed a revolving door, if you allowed
persons to go back to their firms after serving on a full-time board, the inquiries made by the special
committee raise serious questions as to whether you would get enough high caliber people, even if
highly paid, to divorce themselves from their firms for a short period of time to do this work. An
auditing standards board is never likely to have even as much glamour as the FASB, to say nothing of
the SEC.
THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE
Now let me sum up the main changes in AudSEC which the special committee is proposing. Then you
must judge for yourself whether they look like being adequate to meet the problems that exist. The
problems that exist. Let me repeat that. We are not dealing, I believe, with a crisis situation; and
although it is relatively easy for any committee to propose drastic changes, the onus of proof must rest
on those who propose those changes.
First as to the composition and appointment of the new AudSEC -- it may well be called the Auditing
Standards Board. The special committee proposes that it should be reduced from 21 members to 15, a
number large enough to provide a variety of points of view, but not so large as to be unwieldy or
difficult to control by its chairman. Any person who has had extensive experience of auditing, whether
he is a member of the Institute or not, should be eligible to serve on that body. That would probably
require a change in the Institute's bylaws. The special committee proposes that such a change should be
put into effect.(8)
The chairman and the members of the board would be appointed for renewable one year terms but the
normal term of three years which they now serve would be capable of extension by a second period of
three years, that is six years in total but not more. Again there is a tradeoff here between having a period
which is too short for efficiency and too long to provide enough turnover.
There is a proposal to change the voting rule. The present two-thirds majority of AudSEC perhaps does
militate against change, makes it too difficult to get approval of standards which introduce changes. On
the other hand a simple majority rule looks slightly perilous. The special committee is proposing that
out of the 15 persons on the new board nine affirmative votes should be required. That is under two-
thirds but just over a simple majority.
The Institute has already ruled that meetings of its major committees shall be open to the public and
meetings of the new auditing standards board would certainly be open to the public, though no doubt
there would be some matters that they would continue to discuss in private, such as procedural matters.
The Wheat Committee, you may remember, originally recommended that the FASB should not publish
dissenting opinions in the way that the APB had done. The FASB has disregarded that recommendation
and I believe they were right to do so. I think we were wrong on the Wheat Committee to recommend
against publishing dissenting opinions. The reason was that we thought dissenting opinions diminished
the authority of a standard. But I believe myself now that dissenting opinions are useful in clarifying the
opinions of the majority as well as the opinions of the minority.
An important change proposed by the special committee is that members of AudSEC should receive
compensation if they claim it and that they should normally be reimbursed for expenses. An unpaid
committee clearly puts very heavy burdens on practitioners from small firms, and though Institute
committees are now unpaid, so that this change in the rule which will permit this committee to be paid
may cause some problems, it's a situation which I think the Institute should face up to squarely. If we
are going to have a large part-time board, it should be possible for all segments of the profession to
serve on it without great financial sacrifice, and to achieve that, payment for services is going to have to
be introduced. In return for this payment, members of this committee would be expected to commit at
least 50% of their time to its work.(9)
There are proposals for strengthening the committee's staff, for the appointment of a high caliber staff
director, and for the appointment of a separate research director. The staff member designated as the
research director would work closely with the task forces.
Perhaps the other main recommendation, and I think a yew, important one, is for the creation of an
Auditing Standards Advisory Council. How important this recommendation is will depend on the
caliber of the people who serve. This idea has widespread support and I have no doubt myself that such
an advisory council could contribute materially to the board's effectiveness. It could draw the board's
attention to the need for new standards, it would review the board's agenda and express its opinion on
priorities. It would of course review proposed pronouncements, it could provide suggestions for people
to work on task forces and sub-committees. And, not by any means least important, it would be
expected to report at least once a year, in public, on the work of the board and the extent to which it had
fulfilled its charge and its obligations to society. The advisory council might have from between 12 to
18 members and, to quote from the Wheat
Report in connection with the advisory council that we recommended that the FASB should have, ''the
only qualification on the advisory council should be a capacity to make a contribution to the work of the
Standards Board."
CONCLUSION
Let me close with a quotation, not from an accountant but from a lawyer. James Strother, writing in the
Vanderbilt Law Review in January 1975 (his article presumably was written in 1974) on the
establishment of generally accepted accounting principles and generally accepted auditing standards,
had some things to say which really so well capture my own feelings on this matter that I would like to
take a minute to quote from his article.
"The involvement of the accounting profession in the establishment of professional
standards has been a substantial public benefit, not only by virtue of the standards thus
developed and improved, but also by serving as a focal point for the organization,
recognition and development of the accounting profession itself. To a substantial extent, the
rise of the accounting profession has been grounded on that involvement. A profession
actively involved in the development of its standards will do a better job in their
application. By their efforts, the American Institute of CPA's and the independent FASB
have provided a reasonably coherent framework for accounting and auditing practice in
areas that otherwise would have been subjected to fragmented or conflicting regulation.
Despite the benefits deriving from their efforts, these private agencies by their nature must
remain vulnerable to the risk of conflicting or competing decrees and regulations which
could deprive them of their general acceptance and vitality. Their role and importance
could be diminished should the SEC preempt or fail to support them. Similarly, these
private agencies run certain risks if their contributions to the advancement and
improvement of accounting and auditing are not understood and applied by governmental
agencies, the Congress and the courts. At present there is no indication that either the
AICPA and its Auditing Standards Executive Committee or the FASB face any substantial
risk of preemption or lack of support. There is evidence instead that they continue to have
the support they require. The process works more than reasonably well. "(10)
Strother wrote that in 1974. It was published early in 1975. I believe it is as true in 1978 as it was in
1974 that, again to quote from him, "a profession actively involved in the development of its standards
will do a better job in their application. The process works more than reasonably well."
 
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
Dr. Briloff:
With that quotation from the Vanderbilt Law Review of January 1975 I urge that each of you go back to
that very same issue because if memory serves me, there's another article referring to the accounting
profession under the title "We Often Paint Fakes".
Solomons:
By Professor Briloff.
Briloff:
David, for about an hour, and understandably you've been something of an apologist for the accounting
establishment. Briloff, on the other hand will continue in his campaign against the. Mafia which is the
acronym standing for the Major Accounting Firms in America. David, to begin with, with respect to
some of these burning S.A.S.s, statements on auditing standards #5 on "fairly," #6 with respect to
incestuous transactions, isn't that the one, transactions between related parties, 16 on bribes and the like.
I maintain that all of them and many of these SASs are essentially CYA rhetoric, which stands for
Cover Your Anatomy rhetoric. In almost everyone of these situations, I believe you will agree with me
that an auditor with conscience and conscientiousness should have known, like in U.S. Financial, about
the incestuous transactions that ought to be weeded out. Like with respect to Yale Express, where for
about a year they realized that the statements that they had promulgated in '64 were fake but yet they
played possum and kept quiet. You and I know, each of us engaged in any accounting litigation, of the
ways in which the auditors permitted their independence to just go by the boards and where they
permitted the client to bend them, and fold them, and mutilate them. We see it in the testimony very
clearly.
But now you picked me up on the fact that I have expressed by commitment to the he concept of
fairness and you called me on it. I will not define "fair". 2000 years ago someone was asked what is
truth and you haven't answered it yet. If I were to ask you what is justice, you can't answer that yet. So it
is with fairness. I will not answer it. However, David, if when you go through Unaccountable
Accounting, More Debits than Credits, "We Often Paint Fakes," and if you don't share with me the view
that what the auditor permitted to be perpetrated there was unfair, then I will doubt your standard of
fairness. You and I know that when you go into the courtroom you are sworn to tell the truth, the whole
truth and nothing but the truth. But they can't get you on that unless you tell an untruth. Then you will
be persecuted or prosecuted for perjury, as you should be. So it is that it comes as something of a
disappointment for a scholar like yourself, whom I love and respect dearly, to be picking up the
challenge about someone who is committed to the idea of presenting fairly. And all he's saying by that
is, "Look, auditor! When you see the unfair, exercise it. And with respect to numbers, whatever the-
number is, 41 or 5000, about statements subsequently determined to be untrue, exercise it promptly."
Not like in Yale Express, waiting a year. Or National Student Marketing, never telling, hoping maybe it
won't come forward. David, I appreciate what it is that our colleagues in the profession are doing for
purposes of self-regulation. But, as you know, my plea is not that there are problems with respect to the
setting of principles in accounting or in auditing. It's the failure on the part of our own organizations to
discipline effectively those who have gone awry and have erred seriously, where the aberrant colleagues
are part of the accounting establishment. You heard it laid out at the last Saxe lecture with Anthony. No
one has responded to it yet. It was laid out even more aggressively a week ago Friday at the Bentley
College conference on business ethics. Dr. Daniel Sweeney, the head of the Ethics Division, was
confronted with it directly. No response. Now what about the response for the self-regulatory process
through the self-disciplinary process?
Solomons:
As one might have expected, that was a very eloquent statement. But I don't feel that there's really
anything there I have to reply to. Like Professor Briloff, I'm all in favor of fairness. And like him, I
deplore the auditing failures that he has written about so effectively. But that is not the matter at issue
here. The question is whether you can write a better standard, for instance, on the subject of "Present
Fairly" than AudSEC did. Of course, I'm sure it's possible to write a better standard. All I'm trying to
say is that it's a very difficult matter and perhaps they didn't do such a bad job - not such a bad job as to
deserve, perhaps, the adjective "pusillanimous." Abe, you are inveighing against auditing failures,
which I'm perfectly prepared to do as well, although I'm not as well informed about them as you are,
and I am talking about the problem of formulating auditing standards. Similarly, you are critical,
perhaps rightly, of the profession's ethical machinery and the means for enforcing the rules that it
makes. I don't want to get into that argument. I don't need to. What I'm concerned about here is the
machinery for setting auditing standards and all I've undertaken to do here tonight is to examine the pros
and cons of different ways of doing that. No one has suggested, and I don't believe you suggested, that
the serious auditing failures to which you have drawn attention have been the result of poor auditing
standards.
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